BYU

Abstract by Trevor Smith

Personal Infomation


Presenter's Name

Trevor Smith

Co-Presenters

None

Degree Level

Undergraduate

Co-Authors

None

Abstract Infomation


Department

Computer Science

Faculty Advisor

Kent Seamons

Title

Certificate Revocation Forests: Distributing the Revocation Problem

Abstract

Tracking and communicating certificate revocations is essential to the security of the Internet. Current revocation strategies have security flaws, inefficiencies in deployment, or do not cover all certificates. We utilize minimalistic Certificate Revocation Trees (CRTs) to compress Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) into Certificate Revocation Forests (CRFs) to address these concerns. In particular we show how CRFs can be constructed by combining individually created CRTs from Certificate Authorities. We further show storage, bandwidth, and computational metrics for CRFs in comparison to other certificate revocation strategies. We finally discuss the implications of CRFs on current certificate public key infrastructure.